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SUMMARY 
This paper presents some partial and provisional results of a 
broader-based research project being undertaken by the Bank of Spain Research 
Department on spanish fiscal policy. In the flrBt section of the paper we 
sketch the main characteristics of the spanish public sector performance to 
Bet the appropiate background for the 8ubsequent discu •• ion. In section 11 we 
review the broad lines of Spanish fiscal policy implemented in recent years, 
to motivate the issues analyzed in our paper. Thes. iSBues are the 
consequences of a protractedly expansive fiscal policy stance for the conduct 
of monetary policy, and for the saving-investment balance in the national 
economy. In section III we shall consider the Bustainability of this fiscal 
policy in the context of the European economic and monetary union. In section 
IV we analyse the implications of fiscal policy on the external sector. 
The main conclusions of the paper ares 
(1) Fiscal policy and interest rates 
From 1985 to 1990, public deficit fell by 3' of GDP. Automatic 
stabilizers account for this improvement. We have computed different measures 
of fiscal stance, all of which indicate that discretionary consolidation 
efforts did stop in 1987. In juat three yeara, the structural deficit has 
grown above its peak in the last two decades and the primary structural 
deficit has rega�ned its early -80s level. 
We have performed aome econometric work on the relationship between 
fiscal stance and interest rates. Although far from conclusive, most of our 
results point to a positive and significant relationship between indicators 
of fiscal stance and interest rates. This association becomes stronger when 
the fiscal policy variable excludes the interest burden. One point of increase 
- 5 -
in the primary structural deficit leads to an increase in nominal interest 
rates of more than one percentage point. 
The expansionary stance of fiscal policy in 1987-90 has had severe 
effects on the effectiveness of monetary policy. spain joined the EMS in 1989. 
Since then, the policy-mix has been that of an easy budget and tight money. 
Pro-cyclical fiscal stance did put upward pressure on interest rates and 
exchange rates. capital inflows and a booming economy rendered monetary 
tightness less effective in its objective of slowing nominal expenditure and 
inflation. As a consequence, undesirable capital controls and credit ceilings 
had to be introduced in 1989. Although effective in restricting demand 
pressures, these controls have had innefficient asymmetric effects and did not 
prevent some periods of exchange rate tensions within the EMS . 
Recent weakening of economic activity and overriding commitments 
under EMU agreements recommended the elimination of both types of controls in 
early 1991. However, interest rates are still too high, and it is felt that 
an improvement in the policy mix is needed to continue the process of nominal 
convergence without tensions. In this respect, the 1992 Budget does not lead 
to expect significant changes in the policy mix. 
(2) Sustainability of fiscal policy 
Fiscal policy is sustainable if deficits do not lead to an ever­
growing debt. A necessary condition for an unsustainability problem to exist 
is that nominal interest rates exceed the nominal rate of growth of GDP. 
Apparently this has been the situation in spain over the 80s. However, 
mandatory banking coefficients and other privileged sources of public funding 
have reduced the effective interest rate on public debt well below market 
rates for most of the period 1964-89. Only recently a real sustainability 
problem has started to build up, along with convergence of financial 
regulations in the EC and with the introduction of self-imposed restrict.'ons 
on the access to central Bank funds. 
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All in all, the debt ratio ia still comparatively low and the gap 
between growth and interest rates is small. OUr concern in the paper is, 
rather , with the implications of sustainability criteria as fiscal discipline 
indicators in EMU. In the paper we argue that the most widely used 
"sustainability gap" or "primary gap" -difference between actual primary 
deficit and that deficit which is required to stabilize the debt ratio- may 
not be the best indicator of sustainability. We show that this indicator is 
biased in favour of countries with high initial debt ratios when the time 
period allowed for convergence to a given target is long enough . 
The analysis goes on to the issue of "excessive defici.ts" and bands 
for fiscal policy . Aa it happens with the sustainability issue, we discuss 
what rules should be implemented to disCipline budget policies. 
Notwithstanding, it is not an .asy task to devise a set of rules which at the 
same time reflect national differences, and which are either not redundant 
with each other or too strict. We show that bands on primary deficits do not 
suffice to ensure long-run solvency. Given the credibility iS8ues involved, 
the choice of appropriate rules in EMU is crucial. 
(3) Piscal stance and the external sector 
Between 1986 and 1990, the current account has deteriorated by more 
that 4 points of GDP. An important question to ask is to what extent have the 
external sector developments effectively reflected fiscal stance. The 
connection is by no means obvio�s, since causation in the opposite way -as it 
would happen if fiscal policy, were devised BO as to target the current 
account- cannot be excluded. We devote the final part of the paper to report 
some empirical results of background research. The analysis explores causality 
directions between national saving and investment and between the public and 
the private sectors saving-invEstment gaps . 
The results indicate that causation runs from aaving to investment 
( a change in saving will induce a change in investment of the same size and 
sign ) and from the public to �he private savings investment gap ( a change 
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in the public gap will induce a change in the private gap of the same size but 
of the opposite sign }. These findings are conaistent with economies in which 
there is low capital mobility and where capital controls combined with 
monetary policy were the main instruments used to target the current account 
balance • This pattern, which was found for most countries under study, 
implies that fiscal policy has not affected significantly the course of the 
external sector over the past two decades. 
A detailed analysis of recent years for Spain shows that this close 
relation between saving and investment seems to weaken after 1987.This finding 
ill consistent with the increased capital mobility in the spanish economy aince 
EC membership. It may also indicate that fiscal policy will determine Spain's 
external balance position when capital movement a are fully liberalized. Since 
restrictions on the size of current imbalances might emerge from BC consensus, 
fiscal consolidation would be"called for. 
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I. PUBLIC SECTOR PERFORMANCE 
In the last fifteen yearll there has been an extraordinarily rapid 
growth in the degree of government involvement in the spaniah economy. Against 
a historical background of Bubatantial off-budget intervention, general 
government expenditure began to expand aharply in the mid-seventies. As 11 
result, while general government expenditure rose 1 percentage point per annum 
in the EC over the 1975-1985 period, in Spain the public expenditure share 
almost doubled to reach a peak of 42.7 percent of GDP, such figure 
corresponding to an average annual riae of 1.8 percent of GDP. 
This abrupt turnaround in trend reflected two broad factors. 
Pirst, the decline in economic performance relative to levels experienced and 
anticipated in the previous decade led to a marked increase in transfers, 
lIubsidies and income maintenance expenditures. Second, the political reform 
resulting in a democratic regime set in motion a "catching-up" process in the 
welfare state area. Despite the substantial effect. of the l5!77-78 tax reform, 
the strength of the foregoing driving forces out paced revenue potential (the 
tax share in GDP rose by almost 1.3 percentage pointa per year on average), 
relilulting in mounting public deficit-s and rising public debt. The ensuing 
increase in debt interest payments further compounded these difficultiea by 
adding to government's precommitment of reaources. 
On the eve of community membership in 1986, a number of measures 
were implemented with important implications for the atance and medium-term 
effects of fiscal policy. The experience of the seventies led to 
diaillusionment with "fine-tuning", partly because of the negative effects of 
discretionary expansions on inflationary expectationa and international 
competitiveness, and partly due to the harmful impact of deficit financing on 
investment and debt dynamics. At the same time, however, the government 
introduced chan�es in the financing of the public deficit, which shifted away 
from Bank of Spain reaources (Monetary Regulation Loans) by means of the issue 
of Paqar's del Tesoro (Treasury notes), for which a mandatory coefficient was 
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created. Against a background of gradual deceleration of monetary aggregates 
and high interest rates, the move towards orthodox deficit financing made it 
more difficult to attain the objective of halting the deterioration of the 
government deficit. The rapid increase in the share of interest expenditure 
(2.2 points of GDP in 1982-85) obscured the efforts made to slow public 
expenditure growth. Thus, despite the increase in the tax burden and a aizable 
reduction in the rate of growth of social expenditures and transfers to 
enterprises, the overall government borrowing requirement rose to an 
unprecedented 6.9 per cent of GDP. At the end of 1985, the share of public 
debt in GDP reached 44.6 per cent, a figure that trebled the 1979 share. 
Since joining the European Communities, two periods can be 
identified in the performance of fiscal policy: the first, in 1986 and 1987, 
during which the general government deficit fell by 3. 7 points� and the 
second, spanning 1988 to 1990, during which the deficit, adjusted for the 
change in the timetable for tax reimbursements, increased slightly from the 
1987 level. As Table 1.1 shows, in the 1986-1987 period revenuea increased 
sharply, due mostly to rises in direct taxes. On the other hand, for the first 
time since 1966 the share of current transfers in GDP fell owing to both the 
action of automatic stabilizers (unemployment benefits and subsidies) and to 
the effects of the 1985 reform of the pension system. As a result of these 
developments, public sector disposable income increased markedly. Moderate 
increases in public consumption and debt interest payments made possible 
sizable improvements in gross savings and the primary balance (4 points of GDP 
in 1985-87), both of which rose from negative to positive figures. 
After the successful fiscal years of 1986 and 1987, fiscal 
consolidation came to a halt in 1988 and deteriorated thereafter. On the 
expenditure aide, social security benefits and investment expenditures were 
the leading forces behind the expansion. The former regained strength, partly 
as a consequence of union pressures that led to a general strike in December 
1988; the latter responded to the aim of completing major infrastructure 
projects for 1992 (the World Fair in Sevilla and the Olympic Games in 
Barcelona) and 1993 (creation of the European Internal Market). Fiscal 
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developments were somewhat mixed. Despite the reductions in nominal tax rates, 
direct taxes remained a buoyant source of revenues, due to the combined 
effects of strong economic growth and the fiscal drag .ssociated with tax 
progressivity. However, extra receipts were used to finance additional 
expenditures. All in all, the outturn of 1988-1990 fiscal policy has been an 
increase in both total expenditures and net borrowing. These may have lent 
strong support to demand, thU8 shifting to monetary policy the full burden of 
stabilization, mainly achieved through credit ceilings and controls on capital 
inflows. 
International comparieons of general government operations -.ee 
Table I.2- bear out differences between public sector performance in spain and 
in the European Community. First, over the last decade, both current revenues 
and current expenditures have grown much faster in spain than in the BC on 
average. Second, between 1985 and 1990, the reduction in Spain's total and 
primary deficits has been substantially in excess of the average reduction in 
the EC. Third, during this period the improved financial position in spain has 
resulted from tax increases stemming from fast economic growth rather than 
from reductions in current expenditures, as was the average pattern in the EC. 
Finally, spain's marked infrastructure gap explains the sharp increase in 
gross investment, which contrasts with the stability of the average public 
investment ratio in the EC. 
Efforts to reduce the public sector deficit in recent years have 
been hampered by developments in four areas: behaviour of regional and local 
governments, budget discipline, deficit funding, and tax evasion. In the early 
80s, spain started a process of bUdgetary decentralization. As a result, in 
1990 the regional and local governments' final expenditures (public 
consumption plus groBs investment, exceeded those of the State. However, tax 
revenues at the regional and local level of government have not grown in the 
same fashion. The undesirable outcome of the mismatch between expenditure 
responsibilities and tax resources -compounded by the existence of perverse 
political incentives to finance expenditures out ot non-tax revenues- has been 
the emergence of sizable borrowing requirements and increasing indebtedness. 
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At present, the system under which the regional and local governments receive 
most of their funds from state transfers is being revised. 
Turning to budget discipline, there are longstanding budgetary 
practices that reduce the effectiveness of the ex-ante political control of 
budget objectives, thus providing for the existence of large expenditure 
overruns. The 1990 budget adopted a new measure limiting strictly 
non-financial appropriations to the amount approved by the Parliament. This 
rule is intended to limit previous laxity in the concession of additional 
credits. Still, budgetary procedure allows a large margin of freedom: unused 
appropriations can be carried forward, transfers among categories are allowed, 
and financial operations are not subject to strict limits. 
spain had virtually no public debt until the late seventies, and 
up to 1982 the public sector deficit was largely monetized. Seigniorage from 
currency in the hands of the public, combined with implicit taxation from bank 
reserves and investment requirements, have provided'interest savings to the 
government of 1.7 percent of GOP in the 1980-1990 period2• With the 
introduction of Pagares del Tesoro (Treasury notes) in 1981 and Letras del 
Tesoro (Treasury bills) in 1987, short-term securities emerge as the main 
instruments of a more orthodox financing of public deficits. However, the 
extensive use of compulsory coefficients and the reduction of the rate of 
return on pagares -used also as an "anonymous" placement of unreported income 
after 1986- have kept the effective interest on public debt relatively low 
(see Table 1.4), while seigniorage and implicit taxation have remained high 
(2.3 of GDP in 1990 ) . Further, inflationary expectations implied a weak demand 
for mediurn- and long- term debt, eo that the average maturity of outstanding 
balances of debt fell from 2.6 years in 1986 to 1.4 years in 1990. In 1991, 
expectations that inflation and interest rates would fall stimulated the 
demand for medium and long term bonds, and the government has been willing to 
accept the returns sought by markets so as to increase the maturity of 
R. Repullo ( 1991), "FinanCing budget deficits by seignorage and implicit 
taxation: The cases of Spain and Portugal", CEHFI, Bank of Spain, Working 
Paper 9105. 
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outstanding debt. Against this background the ongoing convergence of EC rules -
phasing out of compulsory coetticients and end-year zero limit for Treasury 
net borrowing from the Bank at Spain- po •• a risks of inter •• t cost increa8es 
and instability of the public debt management policy. 
Over the last decade, relatively extensive tax evasion has stood 
in the way of reducing the public deficit. Official Dourc •• evaluate I08t VAT 
revenues at 26 per cent of potential revenues, while unreported tax bases are 
estimated at 45 percent of potential bases for personal income tax purposes, 
and at about 30 per cent for social security contributions. The creation of 
a new revenue service (Agencia Tributaria) is expected to increase 
effectiveness against fraud. At the same time, income tax rebates and 
increased mobility of tax bases associated with convergence in the Single 
European Market may render it more difficult in the future to reduce the 
deficit through increased taxation. 
In the following sections we briefly explore three pol!cy­
relevant issues: the relationship between fiscal and monetary policies through 
interest rates, the measurement and implications of sustainability indices, 
and the impact of budget decisions on the current account. 
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11. FISCAL STANCE 
In recent years, budgetary policy ha. been the subject of much 
debate. From 1985 to 1990, the total budget deficit as a percentage of GDP 
fell by 3 points. That has been interpreted by some as a measure of the 
success of budgetary policy over this period. The acceptance of such a 
conclusion would suggest that the counter-cyclical stance of fiscal policy has 
contributed to keep the overhe4ting of the economy in check, easing the 
mission of monetary policy and helping to narrow the inflation differential 
with other EMS members. 
This optimistic view should be addressed with caution since the 
total budget deficit and its course over time depend as much on public 
spending and revenue policy as on the responsiveness of the deficit to the 
level of economic activity. Insofar as the deficit is endogenous in relation 
to cyclical developments in the economy, the evaluation of the fiscal stance 
should be based on a division of the change in its -budgetary balances into 
cyclical and independent components. Only the latter component can give a 
measure of the success of a policy aimed at correcting the deficit and at 
fiscal consolidation. 
1. Definitional and conceptual issues 
The separation of a deficit's independent and cyclical components 
poses no conceptual problems. Given a time path for the deficit, a good fiscal 
stance indicator should offer a measure of the proportion of changes 
attributable to policy modifications in public revenue and spending. From an 
empirical standpoint, however, certain difficulties may arise (see Blanchard, 
1990 and Gramlich, 1990) 3. These originate in the need to define a reference 
Blanchard, o. (1990), "suggestions for a new set of fil5cal indicators", OEeD 
working Papers, 79, Paris. 
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scenario and elasticities of public expenditure and revenue. Once a trend 
growth scenario has been defined for the economy, actual economic developments 
define implicitly the deviations or gaps in relation to the acenario. By 
applying the related elasticities to each year'. gap, we obtain the cyclical 
change in the deficit. The fiscal stance indicator results from the difference 
between the change in the total deficit and the cyclical variation. 
A scenario can be defined in terms of a basic variable, .uch as 
trend GDP, or in term. of this and other variables : the unemployment rate, 
interest ratee, inflation ratee, etc. As to the elasticitiea, they can be 
related to the set of revenue and expenditure or calculated for each specific 
category. The broad range of indicator. that can be constructed for different 
reference scenarios and different conventions on elaaticities makes it 
advisable to base the choice on reasonable rules. For an indicator to be good 
it should be simple, readily computable, require few predictions and not be 
dependent on specific models of the economy. The "cyclically adjusted budget" 
( OECD) and the "cyclical effect of the budget" (IMF) are two indicators whose 
construction satisfies the rules proposed. 
The reference framework of the "cyclically adjusted deficit" 
indicator (DAC) is a medium-run trend of GDP. This trend can be estimated 
using GDP regressions on truncated trends, 
where Yt is real GDP, ao' and ai are the parameters to be estimated , Tit are 
time intervals (ATit = 1 )  and et is the disturbance. Alternatively, the trend 
may be calculated through estimation of the "Okun coeffiCient", B: 
Gramlich, E (1990 ) ,  "Fiscal indicators" OBCD, OECD Working Paper., 80. 
Paris. 
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(2) 
were ut. ie the unemployment rate in period t. Trend output is defined as that 
which would have resulted had the unemployment rate at t been the same as a 
year earlier. 
Once trend GDP, y�, has been obtained, the elaeticities of the 
different categorie� of revenue and expenditure in relation to output ( Ej ) 
are estimated. DAC is defined as follows: 
(3) 
where Xjt. arE! the values of the different categories of public-sector 
expenditure and revenue (with a minus sign) (for a detailed description see 
OECD, 1989)
'
. 
Chart 11.1. depicts the course of the general government total 
deficit, D, and the DAC in the 1979-1990 period, measuring both variables as 
.. percentage of GDP. Theaa results enable the optimistic position over 
budgetary policy to be qualified. Indeed, following the notable increase in 
the total deficit in 1985, fiscal policy in 1986 and 1987 was counter-cyclical 
and entailed a reduction in the DAC of more than 2 percentage points of GDP. 
This cyclical budgetary etance went into reveree in 1988, whereafter fiscal 
policy became expansionary and pro-cyclical. This behaviour may have claahed 
with monetary policy objectivee, jeopardising the credibility of price-
stability targets and causing tensions in financial markets. If the total 
• OECD (1989), "Indicators of fiscal policy: A re-examination", Paris, mimeo, 
December. 
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deficit proved relatively stable in the four years from 1987 to 1990, this was 
due entirely to the action of the automatic stabilisers during a period of 
strong economic growth. 
The "cyclical effect of the budget" indicator, which we will call 
"structural deficit" (DE), responds to the same rationale a. above; it is, 
however, more straightforward to formulate in terms of computability. As 
earlier, the reference scenario ie the course of trend GDP. 01: is defined as: 
(4) 
where Dt is the total deficit and DCNt the "neutral cyclical deficit", Le. 
that volume of deficit exerting the same pressure on the level of activity as 
that existing in a year selected as a base; 
(5) 
where G and I are public expenditure and revenue, respectively, and where the 
subindex 0 refers to the base year. 
To interpret the significance of DCN, it may help to rewrite 
definition (5) as follows: 
( y. y ) - Io) + Ig -; - Y.t • , ' (6) 
The first part of the expression is a "trend neutral deficit", Le. that 
deficit which exerts in year t the same pressure on trend production as that 
exerted by the budgetary policy in the base year. The second part of the 
-21-
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D 
DAC 
expression reports the cyclical effect of national income on tax receipts. If 
the economy grows below (above) trend, receipts will be lower (higher) than 
the related trends. ThuB, a drop in receipts equal to the product of the 
difference between the real and trend growth rates and the total revenue of 
the base year is deemed to be neutral. When Yo .. Y;, the "neutral" fall in 
receipts is that which presents unit elasticity with respect to the production 
gap. To limit dependence on the ba.e year indicator (4), the "fiscal 
impulse" -IF- is defined as followa: 
(7) 
2. An assessment of fiscal stance in the 80. 
Different measures of DE in the 80s are calculated below. For the 
estimation of Y:, different procedures were used: interpolation between 
cyclical crests, one trend, two trends (1960-75 and 1976-90) and three trends 
(1960-75, 1976-85 and 1986-90). It was finally opted to regresB GDP on two 
trends, with the following result: 
LnYt : 15,50 + 0,06t1 - 0,04t2 
(885,5) (37,5) (-15,5) 
(S) 
where t1, has a value of 1 in 1960 and 31 in 1990, and t2 a value of 1 in 1976 
and 15 in 1990. The trend growth implicit in this estimation is 6\ from 1960 
to 1975 and 2\ from 1915 to 1990. 
Table 11.1 preeents the calculations of the DE for the 1980-90 
period, taking as the base year the first year in the series. The qualitative 
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1 TABLl!: 11.1 
Indicator. of Pi.lIICal 8taJIce 
CIWIIGB DO 
GAP D DB IP D 
1979 -0.97 1.98 -0.43 
1980 -1.70 2.65 0.00 0.43 0.67 
1901 -3.98 3.93 0.52 0.52 1.27 
1982 -4.76 5.62 1.97 1.45 1. 70 
1983 -4.94 4.82 1.10 -0.87 -0.81 
1984 -5.12 5.27 1.48 0.38 0.45 
1985 -4.78 7.03 3.35 1.87 1. 76 
1986 -3.46 6.08 2.86 -0.49 -0.95 
1987 0.06 3.19 1.12 -1.74 -2.89 
1988 3.12 3.29 2.27 1.15 0.10 
1989 5.68 3.49 3.34 1.07 0.21 
1990 7.33 3.63 3.97 0.63 0.13 
'l'ABLB 11.2 
Indicator. of Fiscal Stance 
""""GB 7R 
GAP DP PEP IPP DP 
1979 -0.97 1.36 -0.34 
1980 -1. 70 1.94 0.00 0.34 0.58 
1981 -3.98 3.13 0.45 0.4S 1.19 
1982 -4.76 4.61 1.69 1.24 1.49 
1983 -.1.94 3.40 0.42 -1.28 -1.22 
1984 -S.12 3.14 0.10 -0.32 0.25 
1985 -4.79 3.55 0.61 0.51 0.40 
1986 -3.46 2.08 -0.41 -1.02 -l.47 
1981 0.06 -0.33 -1.69 -1.28 -2.41 
1988 3.12 -0.09 -0.43 1.26 0.23 
1989 5.68 0.03 0.53 0.96 0.12 
1990 7.33 0.12 1.11 0.58 0.09 
Source: Bank of Spain 
GAP = (GDP - potential GDP)/GDP (in %) in real terms. 
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sign of the IF indicator coincides with the year-ta-year increaee of the DAC, 
despite the different assumptions on elaaticities on which each is based. 
As defined, both DAC and DE •• sume that the intere.t burden is 
independent of the level of activity, which is tantamount to postulating that 
the changes in payments relating to interest are discretional decisions of 
budgetary policy from one period to the next. This convention is debatable 
since an increase in the interest burden may originate in an automatic fall 
in tax revenue in the prior year or in a rise in the interest rate on debt in 
the present year due to independent increases in demand or to an increase in 
international interest rates. Accordingly, it is worthwhile checking whether 
prior results hold for the primary deficit, DPt: 
DSPt = DPt - DCNPt 
DCNP • ( Go - GIo) y. _ ( Io) Y t y; t Yo t 
CO) 
CiD) 
Cll) 
where GI are interest expenses, DEP the primary structural deficit and DCNP 
the primary neutral cyclical deficit. Table 11.2 details the calculations for 
the variables defined in (9) and (10), along with the related "primary fiecal 
impulee" IFP. The qualitative sign of this indicator reproduces that shown by 
IF except in 1984, owing to the increase in the intereat burden, an increaae 
which also explains the quantitative difference between IF and IFP in 1985. 
Chart 11.2 shows the fiscal stance measures calculated. The 
results indicate that fiscal policy has not evidenced a stabiliaing behaviour 
- 25 -
since 1987. This procyclical course may be attributed to the extraordinary 
increase of total expenditure. In 
.
just three years, the structural deficit ha. 
exceeded its peak in the last two decades and the primary structural deficit 
ha. regained its early-80s level. At that point the economy was coming out of 
a lengthy crieis. In 1990 it was coming out of an intensive expansionary 
apell. This may have borne on both interest rates and the sustainability of 
the deficit and debt. And insofar as the behaviour of interest rates has been 
constrained by ERH commitments following spanish membership in 1989, fiscal 
policy has since then hampered the task of monetary policy and hindered 
nominal convergence with the core EMS countries. Some of these issues are 
tackled below. 
3. Piscal policy and intereat rates 
chart II. 3 presents the course of nominal interest rates in 
recent years. To what extent may the fiscal stance 'in the 70s and 80s have 
caused the observed rise in interest rates to 1985, hindering their lowering 
thereafter? The question is as important for economic policy as it is elusive 
from the empirical standpoint. 
There are basically two approaches under which the behaviour can 
be explained. The credit market model postulates that the interest rate is 
determined by credit supply and demand (publiC and private): 
i (12) 
where i is the nominal intereat rate, Yt income, CGt credit to the public 
sector (stock variable defined a8 the accumulation of all past deficits), CTt 
i8 total domestic credit and Xt includes other variables (expected inflation, 
wealth, world interest rates, etc.). The empirical evidence available on this 
-26-
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model for the Spanish economy enables the positive and significant influence 
of the variable CGt on the most representative interest rates to be affirmed 
(Haule6n and P'rez, 1985; Haule6n, 1987)5. 
The alternative approach takes the conv�ntional IS-LH model •• 
a reference. Under this model, expansionary budgetary conduct boosts 
consumption and reduces aggregate savings, pushing interest rates upwards. The 
reduced form of the interest rate i8: 
(13, 
where (�t are the real balances, Ft ia a measure of fiscal stance (deficit 
or debt, adjusted or not), Rt is expected inflation and Xt includes other 
variables (capital productivity, supply-side shocks, etc.). 
Several recent estimations of versions of (13) are available for 
the case of Spain. Raymond and Palet (1990)6 use the expected value of the 
cyclically adjusted deficit in relation to trend GDP as an indicator of fiscal 
stance (see Feldstein, 1986)7, obtaining a positive and statistically 
, Haule6n, I. and Perez, J. (1985), "Interest rate 
consequences for macroeconomic performance in spain", 
workinq Paper, 8420. 
determinants and. 
Banco de Espafia 
Maule6n, 1. (1987), "Determinantes y perspectivas de 108 tipos de interes", 
papeles de Economia EepaBola, 32, pgs. 79-92. 
6 Raymond, J.L. and palet, J. (1990). "Factoree determinantes de loa tipos de 
interes en Espaiia", Papeles de Economia Espaiiola, 43. pp. 144-160. 
Feldstein, H. (1986), "Budget deficits, tax ratea, and the real interest 
rates", NBER, Working Paper, 1970, july. 
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significant coefficient. Merino (1991)8 obtains the same result using a 
meaaure of the cyclically adjusted deficit. Tables 11.3 and 11.4 present the 
results of an estimation of (13) using, 0t' OEt, OPt and OEPt (defined earlier) 
as deficit measures. The results are predominantly similar in that they point 
to a positive and significant relationship between deficit and interest ratea 
( one point of increase of the primary deficit in percentage ot GOP would lead 
to an increase of one point of nominal interest rates) .  This association 
becomes stronger when the fiscal policy variable excludes the interest burden. 
The fiscal stance variable best reflecting the pre •• ures of budgetary policy 
on interest raten is the primary structural deficit. 
Theae results, which seem to confirm the conventional explanation 
of movements in interest rates in recent years, should be viewed somewhat 
cautiously. The sample period should be enlarged, whereby the estimations 
would be more robust and the role played by other variables of possible 
relevance (productivity, volatility of inflation, atc) could be tested. In 
estimating bivari.ate (deficit-interest rates ) and trivariate (deficit-interest 
rates-money) models, Ballabriga and Sebastian (1991)9, detected no clear 
interaction between interest rates and the non-adjusted State deficit. Tables 
11. 5 and 11.6 summarize the dynamic interactions estimated in a 
three-dimensional VAR system containing proxies of public defiCit, interest 
rate and money Iltock. Table 11.5 arises from a prior which puts a strong 
weight in the random walk model, whereas table 11. 6 is based upon a non­
informative prior (OLS ) .  As can be seen, the amount of variability in the 
interest rate explained by public deficit disturbances ranges from 2 to 8t, 
approximately, depending on the time horizon; a emall amount, if one a1&0 
takes into account that the calculations are based on a scheme where the 
8 Merino, F .  ( 1991) , "Anllisia de la relaci6n entre inflaci6n y tipo de 
inter6s nominal", CEKFI, Bank of Spain, mimeo, june. 
9 Ballabriga, C. and SebastU.n, M. (1991 ) ,  "Olficit pClblico Y tipos de inter's 
en la economia espaaola: lExiste evidencie de causalidad?", Banco 
de Espana, mimeo, OCtober. 
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TABLE 11 3 · 
LOIIG RUB IJlTBRBST RATES ARD PUBLIC DEFICIT 
(Ioatruaental Variables; 1972-1989) 
coefficients Dt DPt 
0.43 O.OB 
liv 
( 1 . 60 )  ( 0 . 3 6 )  
" 0 . 64 0 . 10 
( 2 . 00 )  ( 0 . 39 )  
F 0 . 60 0.97 
( 3 . 4B )  (4.90) 
Constant 0 . 07 0 . 11 
( 4 . 66 )  ( 10 . 2 5 )  
DW 1 . 67 1 . 65 
a 0 . 017 0 . 013 
DF -3.53 -3.46 
P-Value 0.299 0 . 323 
Note: 11v '" 2!.. where P is the price level py . 
n '" inflation rate 
-31 -
DBt 
0 . 79 
( 1 .90)  
1 . 05 
( 2 . 14) 
0 . 70 
( 2 . 0B )  
0 . 08 
( J .6l) 
1 .  76 
0 . 023 
-3.93 
0 . 19 
DBPt 
0 . 34 
( 1 . 2 0 )  
0 . 3 9  
( 1. 2 1 )  
1 . 20 
( 3 . 35 )  
0 . 12 
( 9 . 0 7 )  
1 . 60 
0 . 015 
-3.85 
0 . 20 
TABLE II 4 · 
LONG RUN IHTERBST RATES AND PUBLIC DEFICIT 
( Instrumental Variables; 1972-1989) 
Coefficiento 0, DP, DB, DEPt 
F 0 . 64 1 . 06 0 . 67 2 . 0 1  
( 3 . 87 )  ( 5 . 9 1 )  ( 2 . 5 5 )  ( 4 . 8 1 )  
Constant 0 . 10 0 . 11 0 . 12 0 . 13 
( 1 7 . 1 7 )  ( 3 1 . 00 )  ( 2 5 . 4 )  ( 29 . 6 7 )  
ow 0 . 84 1 .  58 0 . 64 1 . 71 
0 0 . 0 1 7  0 . 013 0 . 020 0 . 0 1 6  
OF -2 . 19 -3 . 49 -1. 74 -3 . 5 3  
P-Value 0 . 67 0 . 18 0 . 81 0 . 1 7  
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public deficit is the dominant source of contemporaneous variability in the 
sy.tem. This finding does not reject directly the foregoing conclusions ,  but 
it calls for caution when impo.ing unidirectional cau.ality from deficit to 
interest rates. In prinCiple , a measure such as the primary structural deficit 
should be Bcarcl!ly affected by problems of spurious correlation . In any event , 
a more detailed analysis is required to reach definite conclusions. 
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I l l .  SUSTAINABILITY 
1 .  Meaguring BUlltainability 
Fiscal discipline has generally been approached a. a situation 
in which the public debt is sustainablet i. e .  where the government ' s  budget 
constraint is satisfied in such a way that exc •• aive debt accumulation ill 
avoided. This concept is too ambiguous as to generate widely acctlpted measures 
or indicators that quantify it. 
Discussion. on sustainability measures are, howQvert crucial 
since they can lead either to "non-entry clauses" in a monetary union or to 
more or less severe "binding rul .... on domestic budget policies: target zones 
for defiCits, for debt stock, etc. These binding rules may jeopardize the 
active role of national fiscal policies under a fixed exchange rate regime 
with free capital movements in order to accommodate asymmetric or specific 
shocks. 
There are two ways to approach the measurement of Buatainability: 
( i )  time series tests on some relevant variables and (ii) a scalar trying to 
measure the degree of fiscal discipline of a government at Bome point in time. 
Among the former, tests may focus on atationarity of public deficits 
themselves, debt ratios or present values of debt ratiOS, derived from either 
deterministic or stochastic environments ( see Hamilton and Flavin, 198610 and 
Wilcox, 198711) . Alternatively, a joint test on external deficits and net 
saving ratios may indicate a degree of budget sustainability, ( see Ballabriga 
et al . ,  1991)12. 
10 Hamilton, J.D. and Flavin H. (1986), "On the Limitations of Government 
Borrowing: A Framework for Empirical Testing", American Econornic Review 76. 
11 Wilcox, D.W. (1989 ) ,  "The Sustainability of Governmunt DeficitsJ 
Implications of the Present-Value Borrowing Constraint", Jour!n"'C1,--"o"f,-,M,o""n,e,y,,-. 
credit and Banking 2 1 .  
1 2  Ballabriga, F . e . , Dolado, J.J. and Vil'iala, J. ( 1991 ) ,  "Investigating 
Private and Public Saving-Investment Gaps in EC Countries" ,  Bank of Spaint 
working Paper EC/1991/S7. 
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Attention has recently switched to discipline indicators of the 
second type, that we can characterize in the following way: first, they should 
);)e "model free", that is, based upon accounting procedures rather than 
subjective or model dependent definitions such aa cycle, potential COP, etc; 
second, the past behaviour in these accounts is auamarized in the initial debt 
ratio, 80 that attention is focused on the average behaviour rather than ita 
volatilitYI finally, simple and manageable assumptions on the forward looking 
variables that define the law of motion of the debt ratio are introduced : no 
uncertainty and constancy of interest and growth rate • •  We are going to focuB 
on this class of indicators, which are empirically very tractable since a 
single scalar embodiall all the relevant information about past behaviour 
( initial debt ratio) and forward looking variables (constant discount rate ) .  
We will argue here that, among all the possible criteria, there i. only one 
which is widely used ( see Blanchard (1990, op.cit ) }  and that yields a very 
particular ranking of Bustainability for the BC countries (Bee E.C. ( 1990}13. 
Before proceeding with the argument, we should first comment on 
a necessary condition for a sustainability problem to exist: nominal interest 
rates should lie above the nominal rate of growth of GDP ( S88 Box 111. 1  for 
an analytical discussion) . In Figure I l I . 1  we present both series for the 
Spanish economy , for the sample period 1965-90. It should be remarked that it 
displays a representative market long term nominal yield. Moreover. it is 
gross of taxes. It is therefore well above the implicit rate of the debt 
burden of the Spanish General Government, that has had access to special 
borrowing along the sample. In spite of this, interest rates fell short of 
growth rates during the 60s and 70s, and a "solvency problem" does not seem 
to appear up t.o the 1980s, a picture that resembles the Italian and French 
case ( see CEPR(1991} U . 
13 E . C .  (1990 ) ,  "One Market , One Money" ,  European Economy 44, OCtober. 
101 CEPR (1991 ) .  "The Making of Monetary Union" in Monitorinq European 
Integration, a CEPR Annual Report, October ( several authors) . 
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BOX III.1 
We start from a standard intertemporal budget constraint 
for each period t ;  
( 1 )  
where Gt is public spending ( including net transfers ) ,  Tt 
are tax revenues and r B are the net nominal interest t t-l 
payments at time t from the net debt stock inherited from 
the past, Bt_l• The left hand side represents government 
deficit and Gt - Tt ;;; -St is the "primary" deficit. On the 
right hand side we disregard, without loss of generality, 
, 
any eeignoriage receipts, either additional money 
creation or "inflation tax". If we divide ( 1 )  by 
GDPt,calling 9 its nominal rate of growth, we obtain; 
( 2 )  
where a lower case l�tter denotes a ratio over GDP. 
If r < 9 the government can issue debt without having to 
reimburse it. Therefore r > 9 ie a necessary condit.ion 
for a sustainability constraint to appear . It does not 
mean that the debt will necessarily grow explosively, but 
rather that the government will have to generate a 
positive primary surplus at some point in time in order 
to meet solvency reqUirements .  
- 37 -
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FIGURE Ill . 1 
NOMINAL INTEREST AND GROWTH RATES 
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We will assume that the future conditions will ba closer to the 
current experience, since the government is to surrender its ability to obtain 
funding under special conditions. In other words, a " solvency" problem will 
exist unless the government generates a primary surplus for nome periods in 
time. 
The standard sustainability criterion is derived assuming both 
interest and GoP growth rates constant . It basically states that the constant 
or "permanent" required surplus to meet solvency is the product of the debt 
ratio times the discount rate ( approximated by the difference between the 
interest rate and the GoP growth rates ) .  This is equivalent to stabilizing the 
debt/Gop ratio at the initial ratio. In Box I l l .  2 we present the formal 
derivation of such a condition. 
This standard way of accounting for solvency allows us to compute 
"sustainability gaps" and to rank countries according to their degree o f  
fiscal discipline. Table I I I . l  shows, for 1989, the ranking o f  EC countries 
derived from this criterionU • As long as the gap is close to zero, the 
country meets its borrowing requirements. If it is negative, debt policy poses 
no sustainability problems ; positive values indicates that the country ' s  
fiscal policy is unsustainable. According to that Table, there are three types 
of countries: the ones clearly sustainable ( Ireland, Denmark, UK), some which 
just barely meet the requirement (Germany . France, Belgium and 1'he Netherlands) 
and the unsustainable ones (Greece, Portugal, Italy and, to a lesser extent , 
Spain) • 
The stability of the debt/GDP ratio condition is somehow 
distressing since, if taken as a guideline, it allows some countries to run 
permanently higher deficit/GDP ratios than others, in particular those 
countries that start off from higher debt stock. It implies a reward for past 
indiscipline and an incentive to accumulate as much debt as possible before 
the date the agreement is made . However, it should be accepted if it were the 
l� We . take this year for comparative purposes with One Market, One Money 
(op.cit. ) 
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With constant interest and growth rates, (1+i) /(1+q) e a, 
we can rewritE ( 2 )  aa t. t. 
which, for a > 1 ,  can be solved forward, yielding: 
T 
- E a'f-1 s + 
i"'1 
1 
For a constant Br or "permanent surplus " :  
b'f "" - ( a
'f - 1 )  ( 8  / a - 1 )  + 
( 3 ) 
( ') 
(" ) 
The solvency condition states that the present value of 
the debt ratio goes to zero as time goes to infinity: 
( 5 )  
which implies 
s =- bo (a - 1) (6) 
or, using ( 3 )  recursively, 
s * is interpreted as the ':required primary surplus" to 
meet sustainability, hence a - et ia the "lIuetainability 
gap". 
Bole way of accounting for budget discipline. 
We shall now argue that such a standard criterion, and therefore 
the above ranking, are far from being the only representation of the solvency 
condition, even when we adhere to the same basic pieces of information: 
initial debt ratio, primary aurplua and interest and growth rates. Moreover, 
the combination of these variables embodied in the atandard criterion is 
biased in favour of countries that display a relatively large debt ratio and 
a relatively small primary deficit. In Box 111 . 3  we show the derivation of a 
more general sustainability criterion, from which the standard one is just a 
- 40 -
'l'ABLB It I • 1 
SOSTAIRABILIft lUUIXIlIG: S'rAlIDARD ClUTBRIOII (a- - lit' 
Ireland (-6.1) 
Denmark (-3 . 4 )  
U. � (-3.4) 
Germany ( -0 . 7 )  
Frauce (-0.1) 
Belqiu-. ( 0 . 2 )  
lfetherland,a ( 0 . 5 )  
Spain ( 1 . 6 )  
Italy ( 4 . 3 )  
Portugal ( 4 . 3 )  
Greece ( 11 . 4 )  
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TABLE 111.2 
DBBT RATIO AND PRIIIlIRr SURPLUS RARJURG 
DBBT RATIO I PRDmRY SURPLUS 
Prance ( 3 5 . 5 )  Ireland ( 7 . 7 )  
German ( 4 3 . 0 )  Denmark ( 4 . 7 )  
Spain ( 4 3 . 8 )  U .  �qdOlD ( 4 . 3 )  
U .  �gdc:m ( 4 4 . 3 )  Belgium ( 2 . 4 )  
Denmark ( 63 . 5 )  Germany ( 1 . 6 )  
Portugal ( 7 3 . 1 )  Rertherlands ( 1 . 1 )  
Retherlands ( 7 8 . 4 )  Prance ( 0 . 8 )  
Greece (86.2 ) Spain ( - 0 . 9 )  
Italy ( 9 8 . 9 )  Italy (-2 . 3 )  
Ireland ( 104 . 9 )  Portugal (-3 . 2 )  
Belgium ( 12 8 . 4 )  Greece (-10.1 ) 
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particular ca.e: one in which the time horizon allowed for a debt target to 
be achieved is extended up to infinity ( for the formal proofs, see Bl.zquez 
and Sebasti6n 16 ) .  
We can intuitively summarize the argument by comparing the two 
basic pieces of information: debt to GDP ratio and primary surplus .  Table 
111 . 2  ahows the corresponding ranking for the EC countries according to the.e 
variables. For the debt ratio there are, again, three groups , but they are 
very different from the ones reported in Table 1 1 1 . 1 :  those &round the 68 
percent EC average (Denmark, Portugal, the Netherlands ) ,  those below it 
( France, Germany, Spain and the OK) and those well above it (Greece, Italy, 
Ireland and Belgium) . 
For the primary surplus, the ranking is much closer to the 
standard sustainability criterion reported in Table 1 1 1 . 1 .  
However, a s  formally explained in Box 1 1 1 . 3 ,  this approach i s  
biased; a n  equivalent sustainable measure may generate a ranking closer t o  the 
left hand column . We can conclude that there are countries clearly 
unsustainable under either extreme case (Greece, Italy and, to a leliilser 
extent , Portugal ) , countries with a disciplined pattern (U. Kingdom, Germany , 
France and Denmark) and countries whose relative position depends upon the 
time/debt targets chosen ( Belgium, Ireland, Spain and the Netherlands ) .  For 
any target debt ratio other than the initial one, the longer the time horizon 
given to the country to adjust, the smaller the required surplus relative to 
its initial condition. The infinite horizon case is the extreme case, in which 
the relative importance of the initial debt ia minimized . This is, indeed, the 
standard criterion. (See Figure 1 1 1 . 2  for a graphical representation ) .  
16 BlAzquez, J. and SebastU.n H. (199l ) :  "Alternative criteria on debt 
sustainability: an application to BC countries", manuscript, Bank of Spain . 
- 43 -
BOX IlI.3 
A general condition.-
It is somehow puzzling that the standard criterion implies a 
constancy of the debt ratio ( 6 ) , which is a "severe" version of the 
general solvency condition (5 ) .  The latter would allow for the debt 
ratio to grow at some positive rate, provided than it is smaller than 
a-I. Such "severity" is introduced as we solve ( 4 )  for a constant 
primary surplu�. Here we will relax this implicit assumption. 
Consider a target debt ratio for some time horizon: 
for some T 
and 
bT+1 :: b* thereafter. 
This policy is sustainable since it verifies (5) . We will show that 
it is, in fact., a general condition that includes ( 6 )  as a particular 
case. 
We can compute two different . , . . , for t< T 
. , for t> T 
It can be shown that: . 
( bo - b (a -1 )  . , . be (a -1 ) + ( 7 )  
(aT -1) 
( i )  i� bo > b* , the bigger T (the bigger b* ) ,  the smaller 8* and Vl.ceversa. 
as T � � , hence b* � bo (the standard criterion) 
!* g(�ll�r;� �u:tai���i�t��l��� �!�l d;;:�e�e o:e:;�:�o:� b * 
di\appear in ihe infinite horizon case. 
and T, which 
Therefore, by choosing appropiately b* and T for each country we 
could conclude that the solvency criterion (5)  could be equally met 
by every country without distinction (all countries will have the 
same sustainability gap ) .  
I f  we impose that the target b* should be equal for all countries, 
there is still a degree of freedom , given by T, and all countries 
may be equally suptainable. The only way to remove the indeterminacy 
is to fix botE b and T .  Howe�er, as mentioned above the choice is 
not innocuous. The larger T ( b  closer to b ) the smaller the weight 
of the initial debt ratio in the required p2imary surplus ( see (7» . 
The standard case is an extreme version of this case, where the 
infinite time horizon removes both degrees of freedom. 
It should be clear now that the conventional sustainability 
indicator minimizBs the importance of the past behaviour of the fiscal policy 
embodied in the initial debt-to-GDP ratio. At the same time, the current 
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FIGURE 111 . 2  
SUSTAINABLE DEBT PATHS 
FOR DIFFERENT TIME HORIZONS 
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primary deficit ' s  role is maximized. Observation of the time series of public 
deficits of Spain and Belgium for the last decades is illustrative of this 
point ( see Figure 111. 3 ) .  The second country ' s deficit has been systematically 
larger. However, the standard criterion labels Belguim as "sustainable" and 
Spain as "unsustainable". 
2. The question of excessive deficits: bands for fiscal policy 
Long run sustainability requirements may induce establishing 
short-run (period by period) binding rules. There are economic reaeons 
advising against imposing such rules. We will focus here in a more technical 
(yet not economically irrelevant ) discussion on fiscal bands . 
There are several questions that should arise prior to a concrete 
decision on a specific target %one for deficit or debt ratios: 
( i )  Should they be defined for deficits (primary or observed) or debt (gross 
or net ) ?  what are the implications of one in terms of the other? 
(ii)  Should they be symmetric or just defined on an upper bound basis? 
(iii) Should they be fixed on average or should "realigrunents" be possible? 
( iv )  Should they be the � for all countries or specific? If imposed on debt 
ratios, equal bands for all countries are not "egalitarian" ;  on the contrary, 
it implies accepting the initial condition as the desired one, merely limiting 
the variability around it. Som� countries will permanently have more access 
to budget deficits than others. · If they were different, this would allow for 
convergence on a common target in terms of debt ratios. If imposed on 
deficits, equal bands will imply accepting that shocks are s�nmetric. But in 
this case, there is no need for � differentiated fiscal policy; a coordinated 
monetary policy may be superioe. If shocks are specific, equal bands may be 
undesirable and "realigrunents" may be needed . 
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( v )  Should they be constant or vary in a cyclical pattern around some average? 
In the latter case, should they be procyclical ( supporting sustainability 
argwnents) or countercyclical (favouring the counteraction-of-specific-ahocks 
argument) ? 
(vi) What is the suetainability ( long-run) criterion around which they are to 
be imposed? 
(vii) How is the discretionary range (if allowed) for each country set? one 
poasibility ie to look at history ( sample variances) taking into account 
Bustainability experiences (Germany will be a paradigmatic caseI high 
volatility, yet disciplined behaviour ) .  Alternatively, foreseeing the degree 
of asymmetry of shocks to be suffered by each country depending, for example, 
on structural differences. 
To illustrate the complexity of the decision, assume that we 
decide on most of the questions raised above and we
'
impo�e bands on primary 
deficits, symmE!tric, equal for all countries, fixed average (no realignments ) ,  
non cyclical, and with the standard sustainability criterion (target ratio 
equal to initial ratio ) .  Even with all these decisions taken, we still have 
a great deal of difficulty when translating into debt ratios ( which is the 
variable in which the sustainability criteria are built ) .  Consider two types 
of bands on primary surplus; 
( i )  one that allows for a permanent deviation period by period. 
( i i )  one that allows the deviation in present values, 80 that the 
band on deficit:s narrows, and the actual room for manoeuvre reduces over time. 
The first outline would violate the sustainability criterion, so 
an extra clause should be introduced : one that corrects downward each time the 
target is deviated (error correction mechanism ) ;  if the target ( initial debt 
ratio) must be reached in the next period , then the band "disappears" in the 
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sense that a certain surplus must be raised without any room for manoeuvre. 
If a (narrower) band is offered, the standard criterion is violated (although 
Bustainability in the wider sense holds). The first scheme introduces either 
strong volatility in fiscal policy or limits the ability to counteract shocks. 
The second one is not sustainable under the standard criterion, since the debt 
ratio converges to a higher (although stationary) level than the initial one 
( the more general criterion holds since the solvency conditi(>n, in terms of 
the present value of the debt ratio, is satisfied ). volatility is reduced 
under the second outline, but the margins for fiscal policy disappear. 
We may conclude that there ie no outline of fixed bands that 
guarantees the general solvency condition. Moreover, there is no outline of 
bands (including a narrowing one) that satisfies the standard criterion 
(stabilizing the debt ratiO) . although a scheme with narro" .... ing bands may 
fulfil the general solvency condition . In any case, there is a trade-off 
between volatility in fiscal policy and room for manoeuvre. Box 1 1 1 . 4  presents 
a formalization of these arguments. Figure 1 1 1 . 4  illustrates both types of 
bands . 
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BolE Ill •• 
Bands o n  pz"imary deficits . - St 
. 
• + a , 
We consider two different types of bands (both are equivalent for the 
first period ) :  
( i )  at E [- m ,  + m 
Using ( 4 ' ) , we can solve for the debt ratio for a constant a: 
a (at -1)/ (a-1) 
if the country always chooses the "upper" band for deficits ( a=-m ) ,  
under ( i )  b, bo + mea
t -1 ) / (a-1) 
under (il) b, bo + m ( o  
, -1)/ (0-1)0 '-1 
( i )  is not suatai�able since bT/a
T does not converge to zero 
( i i )  is sustainable in this wider sense although it violates the 
standard criterion since bT � bo + ma/ Ca -1) > bo 
Therefore ( i )  requires some additional "error correction" rule: 
St B - aat.1 + at 
and, if thE! upper band is chosen, bt bo + m for all t, which 
also violates the standard criterion. If bo must be the 
target, when a deviation takes place at Bome t ,  bt = bo - at ' then 
SUi '" abt - bo without choice (the band disappears during that 
period) • 
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FIGURE IIIA 
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xv. PISCAL POLICY AND 'l'HB BXTBRRAL SECTOR 
1. Piscal Polic7 and the savinq-Investment Balance 
The relationship between the public sector deficit and the 
current accoun1� of a nation is straightforward. Defined from the National 
Accounts standpoint any change in the current account must originate in 
variations of the public sector deficit and/or of the private sector deficit. 
specifically, f,ince the basic national account identity states: 
CAB GNS - GNI + NCTA (14) 
the current account balance (CAB) must be equal to the difference between 
Gross National saving (GNS) plus Net capital Transfers from Abroad (NCTA) and 
GrosB National Investment (GNI ) .  separating the private (denoted by p) and the 
public ( denoted by g) items of saving and investment , the current account 
balance must be equal to the sum of the public and private saving-investment 
gaps ( considering NCTA to be negligible ) .  
The well known absorption approach concentrates on this national 
account identity. Nevertheless, only knowledge of the causality direction can 
give us a more sophisticated relationship between sectoral gaps than the 
simple and din!ct one of the basic identity expressed in ( 14 ) .  This is so 
because causality means that any variation of the dominant variable will also 
induce a variation of the determined variable, but not simply as a result of 
an accounting relationship. 
There are several scenarios that lead to some causality 
relationships bet'N'een what can be called the private saving-investment gap 
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(GSp - GIp) and public as.ving-investment gap (GSq - GIq) . The following reeults 
are based on Argi.ru6n and Roldin (1991)17. 
First, fiscal policy can be defined as targeting the current 
account. The reasons fo� setting this target may bet 
(i)  The correction of social inefficiencies in the private allocation of 
foreign investment. On social grounds the correct compari&on should be 
made between expected foreign returns after tax with expected domestic 
returns before tax, since tax revenues remain in the home country. 
Nevertheless, domestic agents compare only expected returns after tax. 
(ii) The desire to restrict the inflow of foreign capital to the domestic 
economy due to politicaL rather than economic reasonll. Insofar as an 
external deficit means that foreign agents are buying national •• sets, 
this external deficit can be viewed as a sign of diminiahing economic 
sovereignty. 
(Hi) The need to limit the negative effects on external equilibrium of 
domestic inflationary pressures arising from excessive domestic demand. 
(iv) The departure of the current account from its long-run sustainable 
path. Fiscal policy can be used in this case to bring the current 
account deficit onto its long-run path, thua preventing potential 
external-deficit sustainability problems. 
The complexity of fiscal policies is great, mainly because there is 
an extremely large set of instruments that can be used. Th"se include tax 
rates, tax income definitions, allowance provisions, withhold;..ng taxes, leval 
and composition of expenditures, and legal provisions pertaining to all theee 
issues. Nevertheless, the cl.egre' of control of fiscal policy ()ver this set of 
" Argi.m6n, I .  and Roldtm, J .M. 
International Capital Mobility 
workinq Papers, 9110, Madrid. 
- 53 -
(1991), "Saving, Investment and 
in E . C .  Countries" . Bank of Spain 
instruments is also quite limited, since many of them are affected by 
endogenous factors such as the level of growth, the behaviour of private 
agents ,  and so on. 
For Simplicity, fiscal policy can be limited just to budgetary 
policy. Fiscal policy can be formulated to be endoqenous in the senae that it 
may react to the level and sign of the private saving-investment gap. This is, 
simply, the targeting of current account through budgetary policy: a way of 
achieving this" target is through the offsetting of a proportion of the private 
saving-inveatmE!nt gap. 
This kind of reaction can be extended to the private sector. If 
priVate agents foresee in the budget deficit the future taxes that will have 
to be paid to close the budget gap, they may offset a certain proportion of 
the public saving-investment gap through increases in private saving. If the 
government is running a surplus, the same arguments can be usedJ private 
agents foresee the future tax reductions associated with the present 
accumulation of wealth. 
There is still another causality relationship that can arise under 
a null capital mobility scenario. If private saving and investment depend on 
the level of real interest rates ( say, positively and negatively ) ,  then any 
variation of the public saving-investment gap will lead to a variation of the 
opposite sign in the private saving-investment gap. This result is the usual 
crowding-out of private investment: given a certain amount of national funds, 
an increase in the public deficit will incr.aae interest rates until the 
decrease in private investment and the increase in private savings are large 
enough to finance the public deficit. 
The causality directions that arise from the two polar scenarios of 
capital mobility and of the possible public and/or private reaction to the gap 
of the other sector are shown in Table IV. I .  As it can be seen, the model 
predicts causality directions between national saving investment and between 
public and private sectoral gaps. 
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The results in Argim6n and Roldin (1991) for nine EC countriea (EC-
12 except Greece, Portugal and Luxembourg) lead to the definition of two 
groups of countries 1 
( a )  Those countries which exhibit a high degree o f  capital n�bility. These 
are Germany, U.K.. and the Netherlands. For the U.K.. there is some 
evidence of private reaction to the public saving-inveatment gap, in 
line with the Ricardian Equivalence models (there is cau.ality from the 
public sector gap to the private sector gap) . 
(b) Those countries in which there has been no response by either the public 
or private sectors and there is low capital mobility. For these 
countries there is causality from saving to investment and from the 
public to the private-sector gap. 
The results for this second group of countries can be interpreted 
as follows. First, saving haa constrained investment during the period under 
study . second , the public sector haa crowded out the private sector. And 
third, these results indicate that capital controls may have been the main 
instrument used to target the current account . Indeed , economies which have 
applied extenaive capital controls have been grouped under the low capital 
mobility scenario. 
Another important result i. that in all countries there is a lack 
of response by budgetary policy to the private gap. This simply indicates 
that, if there has been a current account target , instruments other than 
budgetary policy ( such as capital controls) may have been us(!d to reach such 
a target. Monetary policy and incomes policy, to a lesser exent , are the 
remaining instruments which may have been used. 
Indeed, under perfect capital mobility and fixed exchange rates, monetary 
policy is ineffective in Bolving external deficit problems generated by the 
preSBure of domestic demand. Budgetary policy i. then the only inatrument that 
can be used to solve these external deficit problems. Nevert heless, the use 
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TABLB IV.l 
SBC'l'OR RBAC'l'ICB 
PUBLIC PRIVATE BOTH NONE 
CAPITAL NULL S M I S M I S M I S M I ( 1  ) 
MOBILITY D. � 0 0 � 0 0 � 0 0 � 0 , • , • , • , 
PERFECT S � I S � I (2 ) S � I S ,. I 
0 � 0 0 � 0 0 M 0 D. ,. 0 • , • , • , , 
The arrows indicate the causality direction, i.e.  S � I means that causality 
goes from saving to investment . Hence any change in Saving will lead to a 
change in Investment . 
( 1 )  IF S ' p ( r )  = 0, THEN S � I 
( 2 )  IF THE ORIGIN OF THE SHOCK IS IN PRIVATE INVESTMZNT, S � I 
Note: D 
• 
( S
p 
.- I
p
) ;  D9' '" (S
9' 
- 19') 
TABLB IV 2 . 
BKPIRICAL RBSULTS (1960-1988). 
SECTOR RBACTIOIf 
PUBLIC PRIVATE 
NULL 
CAPITAL 
MOBILITY PERFECT u .  ItINGDOM 
For Spain, 1964--1989 
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BOTH NONE 
BELGIUM 
DENMARl< 
FRANCE 
lRELAHIl 
ITALY 
SPAIN 
GERMANY 
NETHERLANDS 
of capital controls increases the effectiveness of monetary po�icy in solving 
these problems. The results obtained by Argim6n and Rold&n (1991) indicate 
that the possible targeting of the current account has used such capital 
controls to avoid the monetary policy ineffectiveness scenario. But the issue 
of why budgetary policy has not been used remains unsolved . The absence of 
response by budgetary policy may be seen as a reflection of the lack of 
flexibility of this policy due to social pressures in favor of certain public 
expenditure categories or to the political costs associated with the increase 
in personal, Gorporate or indirect taxes. 
This exercise for nine community countries has been repeated for Spain 
including 1990 as a sample year. Replication of the exercise for the 1964-1990 
period was considered worthwhile for several reasons. First, it was 
interesting to see whether the close link between saving and investment 
(associated with the low capital mobility scenario ) has been affected by the 
growing liberalisation and integration of the Spanish economy . In other words, 
since the degree of capital mobility has increased during the 80s, especially 
since EC entry in 1986, the saving/investment relationship sh�uld weaken over 
that period. second , in connection with the foregoing , the possibility of a 
change in economic policy stance cannot be discarded; this would have been 
associated with the peseta joining the ERM and would have involved a 
reass ignment of the respective tasks of monetary and fiscal policy given the 
lesser room for manoeuvre of the former. 
The res1.llts obtained for the series of saving and investment and of 
sectoral balances as a percentage of GDP are reported in TabIE!S IV. 3 to IV. 5 .  
In the first table, national saving and investment are observed t o  be 
cointegrated , L e .  although they are not stationary there is a stationary 
relationship between both in the long run. The non-stationarity of both series 
could be tested by the conventional procedures (Dickey-Fuller teata ) ;  however ,  
the fact that there i s  only one cointegration vector already constitutes a 
test of the non-stationarity of the series. Specifically, if there are two 
linear combinations of the two variables that are stationary, t:hen any linear 
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TABLB IV.3 
COINTBGRATIOIII BB'1'WBKR SAVIRG AlO) IIfVBS'1"MiDIT 
VAR ( 2 )  Without constant 
" LR(max) CV(max) LR(trace) 
0 . 0064 (r"'l .s r=2) 0 . 1 6  4 . 09 ( � 1 )  0 . 1 6  
. 
0 . 3991 (rooO .0 r=1)12 . 7 3  10. 622 (r=O) 12.89 
- Long-run relationship: ( s  , i )  = ( 1  ,-0.97) 
- Test of the restriction ( s  , i )  = ( 1  ,-I)  
"lI. = 0. 29932 
Test ; 3 . 8 4  - X2 ( 1 )  
COINTBGRATIOft BETWEBB SBCTORAL SAVING-IRVBS'1"MiDIT GAPS 
VAR ( 2 )  with an unrestricted constant 
" LR(max) CV(max) LR(trace) 
0 . 0163 ( r= l .e roo2) 0 . 4 1  7 . 709 (r!Sl) 0 . 4 1  
. 
0 . 4709 (r=O VS r=1)1 5 . 9 2  13.791 (r;O) 1 6 . 3 3  
- Long-run relationship: (D, , D,) = ( 1  , 0 . 99 )  
- Test 
* means 
Note: ( s  
o f  the restriction (D D,) , 
= ( 1  , 
si nifican g t at the 5\ 1 evel. 
"lI.= 0. 4709 
Test = 0 -
1)  
X2 ( 1 )  
i )  ( 1  -1) Dgl '" ( 1  1 )  since 
CV (trace) 
4 . 0 9  
1 1 . 527 
CV( trace) 
7 . 709 
1 6 . 824 
( s  
.. (Dp 
-i , 
-i9) = [ (Sp - ip) + (Sg - ill ) 1 ;; (Dp + 011) 
LR means thn value of the likelihood ratio test.CV indicates the critical value at the 
5 \ level of significance ' ''i is the eigenvalue of the linear combinations . 
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TABLB IV • 
STATIORARITl' TEST OF TBB IlATIORAL SAVIIIG-IlIIVBSTIIBRT GAP 
A ( e-i l t  = -0.0077 + 0 . 6 1  A(e-l l t_1 + 0.46 A ( e-i l t_:: 
( -2 . 5 5 )  ( 3 . 44 )  ( 2 . 29 )  
-0.92 ( s-il t_1 
(-4.48) 
ADF test crit. value: -2.99 ( 5\ )  , -3.735 ( 1 \ )  
LONG RtrR CAUSALITY 
Between saving and investment 
As, 
= 0 . 355 .Is - 0 . 11 Ai - 0 . 002 (s-l l t_l H H 
( 1 .  33) ( -0 . 7 1 )  (-0.002) 
• i '" -0.12 ABtol + 0 . 375 Altol + 9·479 ( S-i lt_1 , 
(-0.4) ( 2 . 19 )  (2.96)  
Between sectoral gaps 
• D' = -0.006 + 0.726 AD!'l + 0 . 848 .ID' , H 
(-1.61)  ( 3 .20)  ( 1 . 64 )  
-0.879 ( s-l l t_l 
(-4.30) 
• D' , = + 0. 0037 - 0.208 ADP 
_ 
0.432 AD�_l H 
( 0 . 197) (-1. 75) (-1.59) 
+ 0.269 ( s-l l t_l 
( 2 . 51 ) 
PElriod: 67-90 
DW . 2.08 
LM ( l )  = 0.22 
LM(2) = 0.19 
DF = -4.B7 
DW = 2 . 03 
LH ( l )  = 0 . 7 1  
LH ( 2 )  = 0 . 7 0  
DF = -5.23 
DW = 1 . 99 
LH ( l )  = 0.04 
!.M(2) = 0.98 
D. e -5 . 79 
DW = 2 . 41 
LH ( l )  = 3 . 2 7  
LH ( 2 )  = 3 . 63 
DF 0 -4.81 
DW = 2 . 05 
LH ( l )  e 0 . 56 
LM ( 2 )  = 4 . 296 
LH ( i )  ie the LH test of serial autocorrelation of order i. It is distributed as a X2(1) 
Notel (a-i) = (Op + 09) 
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TABLB IV.5 
RECURSIVE ESTIMATION OF THE SOH COEFFICIENTS IN THE LONG-RUB CAUSALITY 
V1\R ' s  
Equation 
Year s i D D 
, • 
1985 -0 . 02 0 . 57 -0.85 0 . 13 
( -0 . 10 )  ( 3 . 31 ) ( -3 . 40 )  ( L 14 )  
1986 0 . 81 0 . 58 -0 . 7 9  0 . 16 
( 0 . 04 9 )  ( 3 . 4 9 )  ( -3 . 42 )  ( L 53 )  
1987 0 . 1 1  0 . 59 -0.86 0 . 24 
( 0 . 06 7 )  ( 3 . 61 )  ( - 4 . 0 1 )  ( 2 . 12 )  
1988 0 . 10 0 . 59 -0 . 86 0 . 24 
( 0 . C 6 4 )  ( 3 . 55 ) ( - 4 . 1 4 )  ( 2 . 20 )  
1989 0 . 2 3  0 . 54 -0. B7 0 . 2 4  
( 0 . 15 )  ( 3 . 2 2 )  ( - 4 . 0 7 )  ( 2 . 2 5 )  
1990 -0 . 0 02 0 . 4B -O.BB 0 . 2 7  
( - 0 . 0 2 )  ( 2 . 9 6 )  ( - 4 . 3 0 )  ( 2 . 51 )  
t-ratios in parenthesis 
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combination will be stationary since it can be reproduced from the two initial 
ones. 
As �he long-term relationship is very close to the identity S=I, the 
constraint whereby the cOintegration vector must be of the form ( s , i } = ( l , -l )  
( that i s ,  saving equals investment in the long run, and there is no external 
deficit in that long run ) is tested, with positive results in the margin. A 
different means of testing this is looking at the atationarity of the current 
balance ( L e .  ascertaining whether it has a unit root ) .  This is shown in Table 
IV.3, with similar results. 
Given that the external balance is no more than the sum of the sectoral 
balances, a test is performed to decide whether there in a stationary 
relationship between both sectoral balances. This is confirmed. Indeed, it is 
accepted that, in the long run, the sectoral balances offset each other ( i . e .  
a private deficit will, in the long run, match a public surplus of the same 
size and vice-versa ) ,  a result consistent with that obtained for saving and 
national investment . 
As to long-term causalities, the results are given in Table IV.4. 
Causality can be seen to flow from saving to investment, L e .  changes in 
saving lead, in the long run, to changes in investment of the same volume and 
sign, but not vice-versa. This result would be consistent in an economy with 
low capital mobility, as indicated in Argim6n and Rold&n (1991 ) .  In the case 
of the sectoral balances, bidirectional causality is observable. Public­
sector-to-private-sector causality, whereunder changes in the public-sector 
balance would lead to changes in the private-sector balance of the same volume 
and sign, is consistent both with an economy with low capital mobility in 
which the public sector crowds out the private sector , and with an economy in 
which the conditions for complying with Ricardian equivalence are met. As to 
reverse causality, the result precludes any interpretation, since the sign of 
the error corre�tion mechanism (ECM) is incorrect . Namely, increases in the 
current deficit lead to increases in the budget deficit, a behaviour of a 
destabilieing nature. 
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Table IV.S reports the recursive estimates of the ECK in the reqree.ione 
of Table IV.4. As can be aeen, the ECK of the investment equation lost 
significance an from 1987, and the estimated coefficient also diminished a8 
from 1988. Such instability might be the result of growing capital mobility 
in the Spanish economy, making the saving-investment relationship weaker. Thi. 
interpretation is consistent with the results obtained by Argim6n and Roldin 
(1991) for countries with high capital mobility ( such as Germany and the 
Onited �ingdom) .  This loss of significance of the BCK is not perceptible, 
however, for the private-Bee tor balance equations. That might suggest that 
the evidence of causality could be interpreted less along the lines of 
crowding out in a closed economy than of Ricardian equivalence . Lastly, the 
ECK of the public-sector balance equation ia significative only as from 1987, 
and bears the wrong sign. Strictly speaking , this incorrect sign precludes 
interpretation; however, to some extent this result would support the findings 
in other sections of this paper : that the behaviour of fiscal policy has not 
been of a stabilising ( counter-cyclical) nature in recent years. 
2. Fiscal COnw)rgence under X.M.O. 
The main conclusion of Argim6n and ·Roldin (1991) in relation to EMU is 
that, insofar as EMU imposes the free capital mobility scenario , we should see 
in the coming years an increasing response by budgetary policy to the current 
account balance (that i s ,  to the private sector gaps ) or a greater spread of 
external balances .  Moreover, if there are external deficit guidelines in the 
transition towards EMU, we should see all the countries grouped under the 
perfect capital mobility scenario with public gap response (with or without 
private gap rellponse ) .  
Ballabriga, Dolado and Vinal. (1991) 18 use a variant of the above model 
to Btudy the impl ications for the sUBtainability conditions of the public 
" Ballabriga , P.C. , Dolado, J . J .  and Vinala, J. (1991) "Investigating 
Private and Public Saving-Investment Gaps in E.C. COuntries", Bank of 
Spain, Working Paper BC/1991/S7. 
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sector, the private sector and the economy as a whole. Along these lines, the 
previous result tor Spain (or Italy) can be read as follows: although these 
countries violate both the government and private .actor intertemporal budget 
constraint, they do not violate the nation' s  budget constraint. However, for 
some other countries, such as Greece, the violation of the government budget 
constraint has jeopardised the nation ' s  solvency. 
Thua, the situation of the public sector in, say, Greece, cannot be 
compared with that of Italy. Nevertheless, if the outcome for Italy is due to 
the presence of capital controls that lower the degree of capital mobility, 
thi. result would be reversed in the EMU process, with the public sector 
deficit possibly generating SUbstantial external sustainability problems . 
Turning to the results of this paper, these can be aununarised a8 follows: 
(a) Excessive Budget Deficits. 
If the fiscal behaviour exhibited by governments in the sample 
period were to continue in the future, there would be potential fiscal 
unsustainability problems for Belgium, Greece, Irelimd and Italy. 
Germany would seem to exhibit excesaive surpluses. 
Nevertheless, if the procea8 of fiscal consolidation in Belgium and 
Ireland were to continue in the future, there would be no fiscal 
sustainability problems as long as these changes prove to be permanent . 
If there is no permanent change in fiscal policies in the future, Italy 
and Greece could suffer problems of fiscal sustainability. German 
unification will surely reduce the exces8ive surpluses and the auper­
solvent behaviour of the public sector. 
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( b )  Fiscal and external sustainability 
Five countries satisfy the national budget constraint : Denmark, 
France, Holland, Italy and Spain. But with the exception of France, the 
national constraint holds without either the public or private sector 
satisfying their constraints. Germany And Holland seem to be Buper­
solvent, and Greece and Ireland face potential sustainability problems. 
Belgium and the United Kingdom are not such problem cases. 
These results highlight the need to improve budget and external 
solvency for those countries facing problems , given the structural 
changes related to EMU. In the case of Greece, solving the budget sector 
unsustainability problems would lead to the solution of the external 
constraint problem. 
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